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ABSTRACT
Originally propounded by the sixteenth-century scholars of the University of Salamanca, the concept
of purchasing power parity (PPP) was revived in the interwar period in the context of the debate
concerning the appropriate level at which to re-establish international exchange rate parities.
Broadly accepted as a long-run equilibrium condition in the post-war period, it first was advocated
as a short-run equilibrium by many international economists in the first few years following the
breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s and then increasingly came under attack
on both theoretical and empirical grounds from the late 1970s to the mid 1990s. Accordingly, over
the last three decades, a large literature has built up that examines how much the data deviated from
theory, and the fruits of this research have provided a deeper understanding of how well PPP applies
in both the short run and the long run. Since the mid 1990s, larger datasets and nonlinear
econometric methods, in particular, have improved estimation. As deviations narrowed between real
exchange rates and PPP, so did the gap narrow between theory and data, and some degree of
confidence in long-run PPP began to emerge again. In this respect, the idea of long-run PPP now













Our willingness to pay a certain price for foreign money must ultimately and essentially
be due to the fact that this money possesses a purchasing power as against commodities
and services in that country. On the other hand, when we offer so and so much of our
own money, we are actually offering a purchasing power as against commodities and
services in our own country. Our valuation of a foreign currency in terms of our own,
therefore, mainly depends on the relative purchasing power of the two currencies in their
respective countries.
Gustav Cassel, economist (1922, pp. 138–39)
The fundamental things apply
As time goes by.
Herman Hupfeld, songwriter (1931; from the film Casablanca, 1942)
Purchasing power parity (PPP) is a disarmingly simple theory which holds that the
nominal exchange rate between two currencies should be equal to the ratio of aggregate
price levels between the two countries, so that a unit of currency of one country will have
the same purchasing power in a foreign country. The PPP theory has a long history in
economics, dating back several centuries, but the specific terminology of purchasing
power parity was introduced in the years after World War I during the international
policy debate concerning the appropriate level for nominal exchange rates among the
major industrialized countries after the large-scale inflations during and after the war
(Cassel,  1918).  Since  then,  the  idea  of  PPP  has  become  embedded  in  how  many
international economists think about the world. For example, Dornbusch and Krugman
(1976) noted: “Under the skin of any international economist lies a deep-seated belief in
some variant of the PPP theory of the exchange rate.” Rogoff (1996) expressed much the
same sentiment: “While few empirically literate economists take PPP seriously as a short-
term proposition, most instinctively believe in some variant of purchasing power parity as
an anchor for long-run real exchange rates.”2
The question of how exchange rates adjust is central to exchange rate policy,
since countries with fixed exchange rates need to know what the equilibrium exchange
rate is likely to be and countries with variable exchange rates would like to know what
level and variation in real and nominal exchange rates they should expect. In broader
terms, the question of whether exchange rates adjust toward a level established by
purchasing  power  parity  helps  to  determine  the  extent  to  which  the  international
macroeconomic system is self-equilibrating.
Should PPP Hold? Does PPP Hold?
The general idea behind purchasing power parity is that a unit of currency should be able
to buy the same basket of goods in one country as the equivalent amount of foreign
currency, at the going exchange rate, can buy in a foreign country, so that there is parity
in the purchasing power of the unit of currency across the two economies. One very
simple way of gauging whether there may be discrepancies from PPP is to compare the
prices of similar or identical goods from the basket in the two countries. For example, the
Economist newspaper publishes the prices of McDonald’s Big Mac hamburgers around
the world and compares them in a common currency, the U.S. dollar, at the market
exchange rate as a simple measure of whether a currency is overvalued or undervalued
relative to the dollar at the current exchange rate (on the supposition that the currency
would be valued just right if the dollar price of the burger were the same as in the U.S.).
In January 2004, the cheapest burger was in China, at $1.23, compared with an average
American price of $2.80. According to the Big Mac index, therefore, this implied that
China’s yuan was 56 percent undervalued. The average price of a Big Mac in the euro
area countries was $3.48, suggesting that the euro was 24 percent overvalued against the
dollar. In contrast, the Japanese yen was 12 percent undervalued on the Big Mac PPP
standard. The Big Mac index has proved so popular that the Economist has also started to
publish prices around the world of another globally invariable standard of value: a tall
latte cup of coffee from Starbucks.
While the Big Mac and tall latte indices are an immediately engaging and fun way
to think about exchange rates, it is easy to come up with good reasons why the prices of
coffee and burgers might differ internationally—most of which are related to the fact that3
many of the inputs into a tall latte or a Big Mac cannot be traded internationally, or not
easily at least: each contains a high service component—the wages of the person serving
the food and drink—and a high property rental component—the cost of providing you
with somewhere to sit and sip your coffee or munch your two beef patties on a sesame
seed bun with secret-recipe sauce. Neither the service-sector labor nor the property (nor
the trademark sauce) is easily arbitraged internationally, and advocates of PPP have
generally based their view largely on arguments relating to international goods arbitrage.
Thus, while these indices may give a lighthearted and suggestive idea of the relative
value of currencies, they should be treated with caution.
The idea that PPP may hold because of international goods arbitrage is related to
the so-called Law of One Price, which holds that the price of an internationally traded
good should be the same anywhere in the world once that price is expressed in a common
currency, since people could make a riskless profit by shipping the goods from locations
where the price is low to locations where the price is high (i.e., by arbitraging). If the
same goods enter each country’s market basket used to construct the aggregate price
level—and with the same weight—then the Law of One Price implies that a PPP
exchange rate should hold between the countries concerned.
Possible objections to this line of reasoning are immediate. For example, the
presence of transactions costs—perhaps arising from transport costs, taxes, tariffs and
duties, and nontariff barriers—would induce a violation of the Law of One Price. Engel
and Rogers (1996), for example, looked at the price differentials between similar goods
in cities across the U.S. and Canada and reported evidence broadly in support of this:
they found that the volatility of the price differential tended to be larger the greater the
distance between the cities concerned, and increased substantially when prices in cities in
different countries were compared (the so-called “border effect”).
Moreover, not all goods are traded between all countries and the weight attached
to similar goods in aggregate price indices will differ across countries. In addition,
different countries tend to produce goods that are differentiated rather than perfectly
substitutable. Some of these problems could be addressed, at least in principle, with better
data. Also, since PPP is based on traded goods, it might be more usefully tested with
producer price indices that tend to contain the prices of more manufactured tradables,4
rather than consumer price indices, which tend to reflect the prices of relatively more
nontradables, such as many services. A recent theoretical and empirical literature,
discussed below, has attempted to allow for short-run deviations from PPP arising from
sources such as these, while retaining PPP in some form as a long-run average or
equilibrium.
These objections notwithstanding, however, it is often asserted that the PPP
theory of exchange rates will at hold at least approximately because of the possibility of
international goods arbitrage. There are two senses in which the PPP hypothesis might
hold. Absolute purchasing power parity holds when the purchasing power of a unit of
currency is exactly equal in the domestic economy and in a foreign economy, once it is
converted into foreign currency at the market exchange rate rate. However, it is often
difficult to determine whether literally the same basket of goods is available in two
different countries. Thus, it is common to test relative  PPP,  which  holds  that  the
percentage change in the exchange rate over a given period just offsets the difference in
inflation rates in the countries concerned over the same period. If absolute PPP holds,
then relative PPP must also hold; however, if relative PPP holds, then absolute PPP does
not necessarily hold, since it is possible that common changes in nominal exchange rates
are happening at different levels of purchasing power for the two currencies (perhaps
because of transactions costs, for example).
To get a feel for whether PPP in either its relative or its absolute versions is a
moderately good approximation to the real world, start with Figure 1. The top panel plots
data on the U.S. and U.K. consumer price indices (CPIs) over the period 1820–2001.
Both are expressed in U.S. dollar terms, which means that the U.K. CPI was multiplied
by the number of U.S. dollars exchanging for one U.K. pound at that point in time. The
bottom panel shows the comparison using producer price indices, using data for a slightly
longer period 1791–2001.
1 We have (arbitrarily) normalized each of the series to be equal
to zero in 1900.
At least three points are worth raising from a consideration of these graphs. First,
absolute PPP did not hold perfectly and continuously: the correlation between the two
lines is less than perfect in both cases. In other words, there are substantial short-run5
deviations from PPP. Second, the national price levels of the two countries, expressed in
a common currency, did tend to move together over these long periods. Third, the
correlation between the two national price levels is much greater with producer prices
than with consumer prices.
Figure 2 shows several graphs using data for a large number of countries over the
period 1970–98.
2 Consider first the two graphs in the top row of Figure 2. For each
country we calculated the one-year inflation rate in each of the 29 years and subtracted
the one-year U.S. inflation rate in the same years to obtain a measure of relative inflation
(using consumer price indices for the figures on the left and producer price indices for the
figures on the right). We then calculated the percentage change in the dollar exchange
rate for each year and finally we plotted relative annual inflation against exchange rate
depreciation for each of the 29 years for each of the countries. If relative PPP held
perfectly, then each of the scatter points would lie on a 45
o ray through the origin. In the
second row we have carried out a similar exercise, except we have taken averages: we
have plotted 29-year annualized average relative inflation against the average annual
depreciation of the currency against the U.S. dollar over the whole period, so that there is
just one scatter point for each country.
Figure 2 confirms some of the lessons of Figure 1. For small differences in annual
inflation between the U.S. and the country concerned, the correlation between relative
inflation and depreciation in each of the years seems low. Thus, relative PPP certainly
does not appear to hold perfectly and continuously in the short run, although it appears to
hold more closely for countries experiencing relatively high inflation.
When we take 29-year averages, however, the scatter plots tend to collapse onto
the 45
o ray. (This effect is only slightly less marked if we take averages over shorter
periods of ten years or so.) Thus, relative PPP seems to hold in a long-run sense. With the
                                                                                                                                                          
1 See Lothian and Taylor (1996, 2004) for a guide to the sources for these data series.
2 Data are from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics database over the period
1970–98 (data were not available after 1998 for some countries). The sample included
data on consumer price indices for 20 industrialized countries and 26 developing
countries, while that based on producer price indices includes fourteen industrialized
countries and twelve developing countries. The data set is identical to that used in
Coakley, Flood, Fuertes and Taylor (2004), which contains more precise details.6
longer-run averages, the degree of correlation between relative inflation and exchange
rate depreciation again seems higher when using PPIs than when using CPIs.
So the conclusions emerging from our informal eyeballing of Figures 1 and 2
seem to be the following. Neither absolute nor relative PPP appear to hold closely in the
short-run, although both appear to hold reasonably well as a long-run average and when
there are large movements in relative prices and both appear to hold better between
producer price indices than between consumer price indices. In other words, as far as
exchange rates are concerned, the fundamental things—relative price levels—apply
increasingly as time goes by. These conclusions are in fact broadly in line with the
current consensus view on PPP. So where does all the controversy arise?
The PPP debate: A Tour of the Past Three Decades
The Rise and Fall of Continuous PPP
Under the Bretton Woods agreement that was signed after World War II, the U.S. dollar
was tied to the price of gold, and then all other currencies were tied or “pegged” to the
U.S. dollar. However, in 1971 President Nixon ended the convertibility of the U.S. dollar
to gold and devalued the dollar relative to gold. After the failure of attempts to restore a
version of the Bretton Woods agreement, the major currencies of the world began
floating against each other in March 1973.
At this time the dominant approach to determination of exchange rates was called
the “monetary approach.” This approach assumed that the PPP exchange rate held
continuously (Frenkel, 1976; Taylor, 1995; Frankel and Rose, 1995). Advocates of this
approach argued that since the exchange rate is the relative price of two monies, that
relative price should be determined by the relative balance of supply and demand in the
respective money markets in an asset market equilibrium. Exactly how percentage
changes in relative money supplies translated, other things equal, into exactly matching
exchange rate movements was not immediately obvious, however, unless one resorted to
the earlier argument based on goods arbitrage: that is, changes in the relative money
supply affect relative prices, including relative traded goods prices, which then leads to
international goods arbitrage.7
A  wave  of  empirical  studies  in  the  late  1970s  tested  whether  continuous
purchasing power parity did indeed hold, as well as other implications of the monetary
approach to the exchange rate and the initial results were encouraging (Frenkel and
Johnson, 1978). With the benefit of hindsight, it seems that these early encouraging
results arose in part because of the relative stability of the dollar during the first two or
three years or so of the float (after an initial period of turbulence) and in part because of
the lack of a long enough run of data with which to test the theory properly. Towards the
end of the 1970s, however, the U.S. dollar did become much more volatile and more data
became available to the econometricians, who subsequently showed that both continuous
PPP and the simple monetary approach to the exchange rate were easily rejected. One did
not have to be an econometrician, however, to witness the “collapse of purchasing power
parity” (Frenkel, 1981): one could simply examine the behavior of the real exchange rate.
The real exchange rate is the nominal exchange rate (domestic price of foreign
currency) multiplied by the ratio of national price levels (domestic price level divided by
foreign price level); since the real exchange rate measures the purchasing power of a unit
of foreign currency in the foreign economy relative to the purchasing power of an
equivalent unit of domestic currency in the domestic economy, PPP would, in theory,
imply a real, relative-price-level-adjusted exchange rate of one (although the nominal
rate—the rate that gets reported in the Wall Street Journal or the Financial Times could,
of course, differ from one even if PPP held). In practice, if we are working with
aggregate real exchange rates and hence aggregate price indices with arbitrary base
periods, it may be difficult to pin down exactly when PPP held in order to normalize the
measured real exchange rate to unity. What is clear, however, is that that there will be
some level of the measured real exchange rate which is consistent with PPP and—most
importantly—that variation in the real exchange rate must indicate deviations from PPP
(since otherwise it would be constant at the level consistent with PPP). Now, the real
trade-weighted value of the U.S. dollar didn’t change too much from 1973 to 1976, thus
lending a degree of plausibility to the continuous PPP argument. But the real value of the
dollar dropped sharply starting in 1977, and from then on it became increasingly clear
that continuous PPP could not hold as nominal exchange rates were patently far more
volatile than relative national price levels.8
Formal Tests of (the Failure of) Long-Run PPP: Random Walks and Unit Roots
One reaction to the failure of purchasing power parity in the short run was a theory of
exchange rate overshooting, in which PPP is retained as a long-run equilibrium while
allowing for significant short-run deviations due to sticky prices (Dornbusch, 1976).
However,  the  search  for  empirical  evidence  of  long-run  PPP  also  met  with
disappointment.
Formal tests for evidence of PPP as a long-run phenomenon have often been
based on an empirical examination of the real exchange rate. If the real exchange rate is
to settle down at any level whatsoever, including a level consistent with PPP, it must
display reversion towards its own mean. Hence, mean reversion is only a necessary
condition for long-run PPP: to ensure long-run absolute PPP, we should have to know
that the mean towards which it is reverting is in fact the PPP real exchange rate. Still,
since much of this research has failed to reject the hypothesis that even this necessary
condition does not hold, this has not in general been an issue.
Early empirical studies, such as those by Roll (1979) or Adler and Lehmann
(1983), tested the null hypothesis that the real exchange rate does not mean revert but
instead follows a random walk, the archetypal non–mean reverting time series process
where changes in each period are purely random and independent. Some authors even
argued  that  the  random  walk  property  was  an  implication  of  the  efficiency  of
international markets, in the sense of prices and exchange rates reflecting all available
information and all arbitrage opportunities being quickly exploited. Under this “efficient
markets PPP” view Roll (1979), for example, argued that the change in the real exchange
rate, since it is effectively a measure of the one-period real return from arbitraging goods
between countries, should have an expected value of zero if markets are efficient.
However,  this  early  strand  of  the  empirical  literature  suffered  from  logical  and
econometric weaknesses. The theoretical underpinnings of “efficient markets PPP” failed
to adjust the expected return for the real cost of financing goods arbitrage (Taylor and
Sarno, 2004). Once this arbitrage adjustment is made, efficiency requires that the
expected real exchange rate change be equal to the expected real interest rate differential,9
and long-run PPP will be implied if the latter differential is stationary.
3 On the empirical
side, the evidence in favor of a random walk was at best mixed and results depended on
the criteria employed (Cumby and Obstfeld, 1984). Sharper econometric tools were still
being fashioned but—as we discuss below—they also suffered from low power just like
these early tests, so for many years researchers were unlikely to reject the null hypothesis
of a random walk even if it were false.
In the late 1980s, a more sophisticated econometric literature on long-run PPP
developed, at the core of which was the concept of a “unit root process.” If a time series
is a realization of a unit-root process, then while changes in the variable may be to some
extent predictable, the variable may still never settle down at any one particular level,
even in the very long run. For example, suppose we estimated the following regression
equation for the real exchange rate qt  over time, where t ε   is  a  random  error  and
α andβ are unknown parameters:
t t t q q ε β α + + = −1 .
If β = 1, we say that the process generating the real exchange rate contains a unit root. In
that case, changes in the real exchange rate would be predictable—they would be equal
on average to the estimated value of α . The level of the real exchange rate would,
however, not be predictable, even in the long run: since the change each period would be
equal to a constant plus an unpredictable random element, the long-run level will be
equal to the sum of the constant changes each period plus the sum of a large number of
random elements. As these random shocks get cumulated there is no way of telling in
advance what they will add up to. (In fact, the real exchange rate would be following a
random walk with drift, which is an example of a so-called unit-root process.) Thus,
                                                   
3 See Obstfeld and Taylor (2004) for evidence on the stationarity of real interest rate
differentials. Under reasonable assumptions the real interest rate differential will be
negatively correlated with the level of the real exchange rate if a loss in international
competitiveness (a real appreciation) has a net deflationary impact on the economy,
reducing inflation and, other things equal, raising the real interest rate. This in turn
implies mean reversion of the real exchange rate since it implies that changes in the real
exchange rate are negatively correlated with the level of the real exchange rate.10
testing the null hypothesis that  β = 1 is a test for whether the path of the real exchange
rate over time does not return to any average level and thus that long-run PPP did not
hold.
The flurry of empirical studies employing these types of tests on real exchange
rate data among major industrialized countries which emerged towards the end of the
1980s were unanimous in their failure to reject the unit root hypothesis for major real
exchange rates (for example, Taylor, 1988; Mark, 1990), although—as we shall see—this
result was probably due to the low power of the tests.
 In any case, at the time, this finding created great uncertainty about how to model
exchange rates. At a theoretical level, there was still a consensus belief in long-run PPP
coupled  with  overshooting  exchange  rate  models;  now  the  data  were  raising  the
possibility that even long-run PPP was a chimera. Some economists posited theoretical
models to explain why the real exchange rate could in fact be non-mean reverting (as in
Stockman, 1987). Others questioned the empirical methodology.
The Power Problem
Frankel (1986, 1990) noted that while a researcher may not be able to reject the null
hypothesis of a random walk real exchange rate at a given significance level, it does not
mean that the researcher must then accept that hypothesis. Furthermore, Frankel pointed
out that the statistical tests typically employed to examine the long-run stability of the
real exchange, at that time based on data covering just 15 years or so since 1973, may
have low power to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root even if it is indeed false. This
criticism would apply both to the early random walk studies and to the subsequent
literature testing more formally for unit roots. It was further taken up and examined by
other authors (Froot and Rogoff, 1995; Lothian and Taylor, 1996, 1997). The argument is
that even if the real exchange rate tends to revert towards its mean over long periods of
time, examination of one real exchange rate over a relatively short period may not yield
enough information to detect this mean reversion. Using simulations in which the real
exchange rate is assumed to mean revert by about 11 percent per year, the probability of
rejecting at the 5 percent level the null hypothesis of a random walk real exchange rate,
when in fact the real rate is actually mean reverting, is extremely low—somewhere11
between about 5 and 8 percent—when using 15 years of data (Lothian and Taylor, 1997;
Sarno and Taylor, 2002a). With the benefit of the additional 10 to 15 years or so of data
which are now available, the power of the test increases by only a couple of percentage
points and even with a century of data, there would be less than an even chance of
correctly rejecting the unit-root hypothesis.
Moreover,  increasing  the  sample  size  by  increasing  the  frequency  of
observation—moving from, say, quarterly to monthly data—won’t increase the power
because increasing the amount of detail concerning short-run movements can only give
you more information about short-run as opposed to long-run behavior (Shiller and
Perron, 1985).
More Statistical Power: More Years, More Countries
If you want to get more information about the long-run behavior of a particular real
exchange rate, one approach is to use more years of data. However, long periods of data
usually span different exchange rate regimes, prompting questions about how to interpret
the findings. Also, over long periods of time, real factors may generate structural breaks
or shifts in the equilibrium real exchange rate. Once these issues are recognized, there are
ways to look for possible effects of different regimes and structural shifts.
In one early study in this spirit, using annual data from 1869 to 1984 for the
dollar-sterling real exchange rate, Frankel (1986) estimates a first-order autoregressive
process for the real exchange rate q of the form
€ 
(qt − ˜  q  )=j(qt−1 − ˜  q  )+εt,
where 
€ 
˜  q  is the assumed constant equilibrium level of q, t ε  is a random disturbance, and
j  is the autocorrelation coefficient—an unknown parameter governing the speed of
mean reversion. Notice that a proportion of j  times the random shock at time t–1,  1 − t ε ,
will still be part of the real exchange rate deviation at time t. Hence, we can say that
shocks die out—or the real exchange rate reverts towards its mean of q ~—at the rate of
) 1 ( j − per period. (If the real exchange rate followed a random walk, then  1 = j  and12
shocks would never die out.) Frankel’s point estimate of j  is 0.86 and he is able to reject
the hypothesis of a random walk at the 5 percent level.
Similar results to Frankel’s were obtained by Edison (1987), based on an analysis
of data over the period 1890–1978, and by Glen (1992), using a data sample spanning the
period 1900–1987. Lothian and Taylor (1996) use two centuries of data on dollar-sterling
and franc-sterling real exchange rates, reject the random-walk hypothesis and find point
estimates of j  of 0.89 for dollar-sterling and of 0.76 for franc-sterling. Moreover, they
are unable to detect any significant evidence of a structural break between the pre– and
post–Bretton Woods period. Taylor (2002) extends the long-run analysis to a set of 20
countries over the 1870–1996 period and also finds support for PPP and coefficients that
are stable in the long run. Studies such as these provide the formal counterpart to the
informal evidence of long-run relative PPP like eyeballing Figure 1.
Another approach to providing a convincing test of real exchange rate stability,
while limiting the timeframe to the post–Bretton Woods period, is to use more countries.
By increasing the amount of information employed in the tests across exchange rates, the
power of the test should be increased. In an early study of this type, Abuaf and Jorion
(1990) examine a system of 10 first-order autoregressive regressions for real dollar
exchange  rates  over  the  period  1973–87,  where  the  autocorrelation  coefficient  is
constrained to be the same in every case. Their results indicate a marginal rejection of the
null hypothesis of joint non-mean reversion at conventional significance levels, which
they interpret this as evidence in favor of long-run PPP. An academic cottage industry
sprang up in the 1990s to apply unit root tests to real exchange rate data on panels of
countries for the post–Bretton Woods period. A number of these studies claimed to
provide evidence supporting long-run PPP. Taylor and Sarno (1998), however, issued an
important warning in interpreting these findings. The tests typically applied in these
panel-data studies test the null hypothesis that none of the real exchange rates under
consideration are mean reverting. If this null hypothesis is rejected, then the most that can
be inferred is that at least one of the rates is mean reverting. However, researchers tended
to  draw  a  much  stronger  inference  that  all of the real exchange rates were mean
reverting—and this broader inference is not valid. Some researchers have sought to
remedy this shortcoming by designing alternative tests—for example Taylor and Sarno13
(1998) suggest testing the hypothesis that at least one of real exchange rates is non-mean
reverting, rejection of which would indeed imply that they are all mean  reverting.
However, such alternative tests are generally less powerful, so that their application has
not led to clear-cut conclusions (Taylor and Sarno, 1998; Sarno and Taylor, 1998).
PPP Puzzles
The research on the evolution of exchange rates from the 1970s to the turn of the century
has generally been interpreted as supporting the hypothesis that exchange rates adjust to
the PPP level in the long run. But the evidence is weak. For example, rejecting at
standard levels of statistical significance the null hypothesis that a unit root exists
certainly doesn’t prove that a long-run PPP exchange rate exists, either. The long-span
studies raise the issue of possible regime shifts and whether the recent evidence may be
swamped by history. The panel-data studies raise the issue of whether the hypothesis of
non-mean reversion is being rejected because of just a few mean-reverting real exchange
rates within the panel. If exchange rates do tend to converge to PPP, economists have—at
least so far—had a hard time presenting strong evidence to support the claim. Following
Taylor, Peel and Sarno (2001), we see the puzzling lack of strong evidence for long-run
PPP—especially for the post–Bretton Woods period—as the first PPP puzzle.
A second related puzzle also exists. In the mid-1980s, Huizinga (1987) and others
began to notice that even the studies that were interpreted as supporting the thesis that
PPP holds in the long run also suggested that the speed at which real exchange rates
adjust to the PPP exchange rate was extremely slow. A few years later, Rogoff (1996, p.
647) presented the puzzle this way: “The purchasing power parity puzzle then is this:
How can one reconcile the enormous short-term volatility of real exchange rates with the
extremely slow rate at which shocks appear to damp out?”
As we noted above, this speed is related to the estimated coefficient in the
autoregressive process described earlier: a proportion of j  of any shock will still remain
after one period, 
2 j  of it remains after two periods, and in general, 
n j  of the shock will
remain after n periods. One way to get a feel for how fast the real exchange rate mean
reverts by asking how long it would take for the effect of a shock to die out by 50
percent—in other words, we can compute the half-life of shocks to the real exchange rate.14
Based on a reading of the panel unit root and long-span investigations of long-run
PPP, Rogoff (1996) notes a high degree of consensus concerning the estimated half-lives
of adjustment: they mostly tend to fall into the range of three to five years. Moreover,
most such estimates were based on ordinary least squares methods, which may be biased
because ordinary least squares will tend to push the estimated autocorrelation coefficient
away from one to avoid nonstationarity; using different estimation methods to correct for
bias, but still in a linear setting, some authors have argued that half-lives are even longer
(for example, Murray and Papell, 2004; Chen and Engel, 2004). Now, although real
shocks to tastes and technology might plausibly account for some of the observed high
volatility in real exchange rates (Stockman, 1988), Rogoff argues that most of the slow
speed of adjustment) must be due to the persistence in nominal variables such as nominal
wages and prices. But nominal variables would be expected to adjust much faster than a
half-life of three to five years for exchange rates would suggest.
The apparently very slow speed slow speed of adjustment of real exchange
rates—from 0 to about 10 percent or so per annum—has been the source of considerable
theoretical and empirical research in recent years.
Nonlinearity?
One approach to resolving the PPP puzzles lies in allowing for nonlinear dynamics in real
exchange rate adjustment. In a linear framework, the adjustment speed of PPP deviations
from parity is assumed to be uniform at all times and, in particular, for all sizes of
deviation, and implicitly the econometric problem is reduced to the estimation of a single
parameter—the half-life. While this framework is very convenient, there are good
reasons for suspecting that the speed of convergence toward the PPP exchange rate
should be greater as the deviation from PPP rises in absolute value. Indeed, some ninety
years ago, Heckscher (1916) suggested that adjustment may be nonlinear because of
transactions costs in international arbitrage. For example, if two goods differ in price
(expressed in a common currency) in different countries because PPP does not hold, it
won’t be worth arbitraging and therefore correcting the price difference unless the
anticipated profit exceeds the cost of shipping goods between the two locations. This
insight began to be expressed more formally in the theoretical literature starting in the15
late 1980s (for example, Benninga and Protopapadakis, 1988; Williams and Wright,
1991; Dumas, 1992). The qualitative effect of such frictions is similar in all of the
proposed models: the lack of arbitrage arising from transactions costs such as shipping
costs creates a “band of inaction” within which price dynamics in the two locations are
essentially disconnected. Such transactions costs might take the form of the stylized
“iceberg” shipping costs (“iceberg” because some of the goods effectively disappear
when they are shipped and the transaction cost may also be proportional to the distance
shipped), fixed costs of trading operations or of shipments, or time lags for the delivery
of goods from one location to another.
In empirical work on mean reversion in the real exchange rate, nonlinearity can be
examined through the estimation of models that allow the autoregressive parameter to
vary. For example, transactions costs of arbitrage may lead to changes in the real
exchange rate being purely random until a threshold equal to the transactions cost is
breached, when arbitrage takes place and the real exchange rate mean reverts back
towards the band through the influence of goods arbitrage (although the return is not
instantaneous because of shipping time, increasing marginal costs, or other frictions).
This kind of model is known as “threshold autoregressive.”
The model applies straightforwardly to individual commodities. Focusing on gold
as foreign exchange, Canjels, Prakash-Canjels and Taylor (forthcoming) studied the
classical gold standard using such a framework applied to daily data from 1879 to 1913;
they  found  dollar-sterling  exchange-rate  adjustment  consistent  with  a  threshold
autoregressive model. Examining subindices of the consumer price index, Obstfeld and
Taylor (1997) modeled price adjustment in various international cities in the post-1973
period and also found significant nonlinearities. The implied transaction cost bands and
adjustment speeds were also found to be of a reasonable size (consistent with direct
shipping cost measures) and to vary systematically with impediments such as distance,
tariffs, quotas, and exchange-rate volatility. Sarno, Taylor, and Chowdhury (2004)
employ this approach with disaggregated data across a broad range of goods in the G-7
countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United
States). Zussman (2003) uses a threshold autoregressive model with the postwar Penn16
World Table data to show nonlinear adjustment speeds for a very wide sample of
countries.
Using a threshold autoregressive model for real exchange rates as a whole,
however, could pose some conceptual difficulties. Transactions costs are likely to differ
across goods, and so the speed at which price differentials are arbitraged may differ
across goods (Cheung, Chinn and Fujii, 2001). Now, the aggregate real exchange rate is
usually constructed as the nominal exchange rate multiplied by the ratio of national
aggregate price level indices and so, instead of a single threshold barrier, a range of
thresholds will be relevant, corresponding to the various transactions costs of the various
goods whose prices are included in the indices. Some of these thresholds might be quite
small (for example, because they are easy to ship) while others will be larger. As the real
exchange rate moves further and further away from the level consistent with PPP, more
and more of the transactions thresholds would be breached and so the effect of arbitrage
would be increasingly felt. How might we address this type of aggregation problem? One
way is to employ a well-developed class of econometric models that embody a kind of
smooth but nonlinear adjustment such that the speed of adjustment increases as the real
exchange rate moves further away from the level consistent with PPP.
4 Using a smooth
version of a threshold autoregressive model, and data on real dollar exchange rates
among the G-5 countries (France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United
States), Taylor, Peel, and Sarno (2001) reject the hypothesis of a unit root in favor of the
alternative hypothesis of nonlinearly mean-reverting real exchange rates—and using data
just for the post–Bretton Woods period, thus solving the first PPP puzzle. They also find
that for modest real exchange shocks in the 1 to 5 percent range, the half-life of decay is
                                                   
4 The smoothly adjusting extension of the threshold autoregressive or TAR model is the
aptly-named smooth-transition autoregressive or STAR model (Granger and Teräsvirta,
1992) and the exponential STAR or ESTAR has proved very successful in the application
to real exchange rates (Michael, Nobay and Peel, 1997; Taylor and Peel, 2000). The
ESTAR model can be thought of as a TAR with an infinite number of regimes and a
continuously varying and bounded adjustment speed; Sarno and Taylor (2002) offer a
textbook  treatment.  Alternative  treatments  of  the  goods-aggregation  problem  are
currently being explored, but not without controversy (Imbs et al., 2002; Chen and Engel,
2004).17
under 3 years, while for larger shocks the half-life of adjustment is estimated much
smaller—thus going some way towards solving the second PPP puzzle.
While transactions costs models have most often been advanced as possible
sources  of  nonlinear  adjustment,  other  less  formal  arguments  for  the  presence  of
nonlinearities have also been advanced. Kilian and Taylor (2003), for example, suggest
that nonlinearity may arise from the heterogeneity of opinion in the foreign exchange
market concerning the equilibrium level of the nominal exchange rate: as the nominal
rate takes on more extreme values, a greater degree of consensus develops concerning the
appropriate direction of exchange rate moves, and traders act accordingly. Taylor (2004)
argues that exchange rate nonlinearity may also arise from the intervention operations of
central  banks:  intervention  is  more  likely  to  occur  and  to  be  effective  when  the
nominal—and hence the real—exchange rate has been driven a long distance away from
its PPP or fundamental equilibrium.
In sum, the nonlinear approach to real exchange rate modeling offers some
resolution of the PPP puzzles. Moreover, simulations show that if the true data are
generated by a nonlinear process, but then a linear unit root or other linear autoregressive
model is estimated, problems can easily arise. Standard unit root tests, already weak in
power, are further enfeebled in this setting and half-lives can be dramatically exaggerated
(Granger and Teräsvirta, 1992; Taylor, 2001; Taylor, Peel, and Sarno, 2001).
The transactions-cost approach to real exchange rates is also generating influential
intellectual spillovers into current research flourishing at the nexus of the two fields of
international trade and international macroeconomics. The study of international trade
has currently been enlivened by a new focus on the role of physical and other barriers,
such as distance, remoteness, borders, or various policies (Anderson and van Wincoop,
2004). International macroeconomists are also now making explicit the role of these
trading frictions in new models where such refinements may yet help us solve some of
the major puzzles in the field (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2001; Betts and Kehoe, 2001; Bergin
and Glick, 2003; Ghironi and Melitz, 2003).18
Remaining Puzzles: Short-Run Disturbances, Long-Run Equilibrium
Empirical work that focuses on the path of real exchange rates must grapple with three
key factors: the reversion speed; the volatility of the disturbance term; and the long-run,
or equilibrium, level of the real exchange rate. Most of our discussion to this point, in
keeping with the focus of the literature, has pertained to the reversion speed, which is a
medium-run phenomenon. But in the future, we expect to see more attention given to the
disturbances, which are a short-run phenomenon measured over months, and also to the
very long-run question of what is the equilibrium real exchange rate. Thus, questions
about the real exchange rate are likely to shift—from not so much “how fast is it
reverting?” to “how did it deviate in the first place?” and “what is it reverting to?”
5
Exchange Rate Disturbances
Even if current work can establish that exchange rates do revert to the PPP rate over the
medium term at a more reasonable speed, the volatilities present in the data in the short
run, at least under floating-rate regimes, still cause considerable mystification. Over short
periods, nominal exchange rates move substantially and prices do not, so real and
nominal exchange rate volatilities in the short term are correlated almost one for one, and
the Law of One Price for traded goods is often violated (Flood and Rose, 1995). This
pattern holds across different monetary regime types over a wide swathe of historical
experience (Taylor, 2002). Despite efforts to explain such phenomena as a result of taste
or technology shocks in flexible-price models, it is implausible that the patterns could be
traced wholly to real factors: history shows that volatilities also differ systematically
across monetary regimes, a situation where a money-neutral real business-cycle model
would generate invariant predictions.
6 Instead, it is likely that some combination of
                                                   
5 Of course, with reference to the PPP puzzle, the literature on real exchange rates has
generally been focused on monthly or lower frequencies, since this is where price index
data are available. There are plenty of nominal exchange rate puzzles at even higher
frequency—weekly, daily, even intra-day—but these are more properly in the domain of
finance than international macroeconomics and are outside the scope of this survey.
6 For example, it is hard to imagine that, say, the real shocks to the Argentine economy
were small in the 1960s, say, suddenly became several times larger during the 1980s
hyperinflations,  then  shrank  again  in  the  1990s  currency-board  epoch,  only  to19
monetary policy and price stickiness plays a role in the short-run volatility of exchange
rates, mechanisms that could be amplified by other types of frictions.
Various new strands in the literature seek to address these issues. One common
theme recognizes the important role of frictions in trade, not just for generating no-
arbitrage bands for traded goods, but for delineating traded from nontraded varieties.
Economies may be more closed than we once thought, since large sectors like retailing,
wholesaling and distribution are non-traded—even if the price of imports as measured in
official data typically includes some element of these domestic costs (Obstfeld, 2001;
Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2001; Burstein, Neves and Rebelo, 2003).
In an economy with price stickiness and a non-traded sector, small monetary
shocks can generate high levels of exchange rate volatility. For example, Burstein,
Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2003) model a price-sticky nontraded sector with a share of the
economy well above 0.5, which yields a large devaluation response of an emerging-
market country even for a small monetary shock. When the nontraded share of the
economy rises, the economy is less “open” and the Law of One Price assumption applies
to a smaller fraction of goods (here, imported varieties), implying a larger role for
exchange rate overshooting and other sources of exchange rate volatility (Obstfeld and
Rogoff, 2000; Hau, 2000, 2002). Considerable future research remains to be done in this
area to establish a general framework that will apply to a wide range of cases.
Long-Run Movements of the Real Exchange Rate
The PPP exchange rate theory is built on the concept that the exchange rate is based on
actual buying power over a basket of goods, and so changes in the nominal exchange rate
should reflect changes in the price of goods—with the real exchange rate staying fixed.
But a nation’s equilibrium real exchange rate may not remain fixed forever.
One of the textbook explanations for changes in the level of the real exchange rate
focuses on the net international asset position. Consider a small, open economy in long-
run equilibrium. Now impose a shock in the form of an increase in external debt. The
country must run a trade surplus in the future to service the interest payments due. To
                                                                                                                                                          
mysteriously reappear in late 2001. But we do know that to a first approximation
Argentina’s turbulent monetary history matches the observed volatilities very closely.20
encourage foreign consumers to import more, and to encourage its own consumers to
import less, the country’s competitiveness must improve in equilibrium. With the
nominal exchange rate defined as the domestic price of foreign currency, this means that
the equilibrium level of the real exchange rate must rise, making the country’s exports
cheaper to foreigners and its foreign imports more expensive to domestic residents. This
example supposes differentiated goods at home and abroad, but the logic holds in a wide
range of models (like the portfolio balance model of Taylor, 1995; Sarno and Taylor,
2002b).
Lane and Milesi-Ferreti (2002) present some empirical confirmation of this
argument. They find that countries with a larger positive net asset position have more
positive trade balances and stronger real exchange rates, controlling for other factors and
allowing for real return differentials across countries. This result has implications for the
study of real exchange rate dynamics. If the equilibrium PPP exchange rate changes as a
result  of  changes  in  net  wealth,  and  if  these  shifts  are  not  controlled  for  in  an
autoregression, then the exchange rate will appear to deviate from what is falsely
assumed to be a fixed PPP rate for too much or for too long
The  other  textbook  story  for  trending  real  exchange  rates  is  built  around
nontraded goods. Standard arbitrage arguments may lead PPP to hold for traded goods,
but these arguments fail for nontraded goods, so that we must either abandon PPP theory,
or else modify it. The Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson model of equilibrium real exchange
rates is attracting renewed interest as a desirable modification after languishing for some
years in relative obscurity (Harrod, 1933; Balassa, 1964; Samuelson, 1964).
In this model, rich countries supposedly grow rich by advancing productivity in
traded “modern” sectors (say, manufacturing). Meantime, all nontraded “traditional”
sectors, in rich and poor countries alike, remain in technological stasis (say, haircuts).
Suppose the Law of One Price holds among traded goods and we live in a world where
labor is mobile intersectorally, but not internationally. As productivity in the modern
sector rises, wage levels rise, so prices of nontraded goods will have to rise (as there has
been no rise in productivity in that sector). If we measure the overall price index as a
weighted average of traded and nontraded goods prices, relatively rich countries will tend
to have “overvalued” currencies. The example of fast-growing Japan springs to mind,21
where the trend real exchange rate has steadily appreciated by a about 1.5 percent per
year since 1880; the opposite trend has sometimes been observed in slow growth eras, for
example, in Argentina (Taylor 2002; Froot and Rogoff, 1995; Rogoff, 1996).
Early studies of Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson effect such as Officer (1982) found
little support in the data from the 1950s to the early 1970s. But newer research dealing
with later periods has often found support for this hypothesis and it is now textbook
material (for example, Micossi and Milesi-Ferreti, 1994; De Gregorio, Giovannini, and
Wolf, 1994; Chinn, 2000).
Why have more recent studies provided stronger evidence of the Harrod-Balassa-
Samuelson effect? At some level, the reasons reflect developments in the PPP literature
more broadly: more data, of longer span, for a wider sample of countries, coupled with
more powerful univariate and panel econometric techniques, has allowed researchers to
take a once-fuzzy relationship in the data and make it tighter.
In  addition,  recent  work  suggests  that  the  magnitude  of  Harrod-Balassa-
Samuelson effect has been variable over time—certainly in the postwar period, and
perhaps going back several centuries (Bergin, Glick, and Taylor, 2004). Consider the
relationships in Figure 3. The horizontal axis shows the per capita income level of
countries as a ratio of the U.S. per capita income level, expressed in log terms. The
vertical axis shows the common-currency Penn World Table Consumer Price Index price
level of other countries as a ratio of the U.S. CPI price level—that is, the real exchange
rate level—again expressed as a log. (Note that most countries have incomes and price
levels lower than the United States, so the ratios are less than one, and the logs are
negative.) The Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis suggests that as per capita income
rises, driven by productivity growth in tradeables, then price levels should also rise: there
should be a positive correlation in the scatterplot. The graphs show that the cross-country
relationship between income per capita and the price level has been intensifying since
1950; once close to zero, and statistically insignificant, the elasticity is now over one half.
The null hypothesis of a zero slope can be rejected beginning in the early 1960s when
Balassa and Samuelson wrote their seminal papers (albeit with no knowledge of these
hypothesis tests).22
It’s not clear why the Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson effect has altered over time. One
possible explanation is that the nontraded share has increased over time, but this effect
doesn’t seem to have enough magnitude to match the changes that have occurred, nor to
match the timing of the changes (remember that global trade in 1950, after world wars
and depression, was a lower share of output than in 1913 or in 2000). Perhaps the
productivity advances of traded and nontraded goods have differed at various times? This
may better help us explain the data, but over long time frames begs the question of which
goods are traded and why. Bergin, Glick and Taylor (2004) advance the hypothesis that
trade costs determine tradability patterns, which allows a variety of possible productivity
shocks to eventually give rise to an endogenous Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson effect.
But the key point here is that if the equilibrium exchange rate is moving gradually
over time, and our statistical analysis presupposes that but the PPP exchange rate is fixed
over time, then estimates of the speed of reversion to the will be biased. An allowance for
such long run trends can make a material difference in resolving the puzzles about
whether and how fast the exchange rate moves to its PPP level. For example, Taylor
(2002) finds relatively low half-lives in a 20-country panel when an allowance is made
for long run trends in the equilibrium exchange rate. Allowing for nonlinear time trends,
Lothian and Taylor (2000) suggest that the half-life of deviations from PPP for the U.S.-
U.K. exchange rate may be as low as 2 1/2 years. Lothian and Taylor (2004) show that
the Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson effect may account for about a third of the variation in
this real exchange rate.
The equilibrium real exchange rate could shift for a number of reasons over the
very  long  run:  wealth  effects,  productivity  effects,  and  other  forces  could  all  be
important. Models that allow for a time-varying equilibrium real exchange rate, and
permit an exploration of its causes and consequences, are likely to be a busy area for
future research. Coordinated progress on these fronts will not only refine our resolution
of the PPP puzzle, they will also help us address related puzzles in the macroeconomic
literature.  For  example,  Engel  (1999,  2000)  decomposed  the  variance  of  the  real
exchange rate into external traded goods prices and internal traded-versus-nontraded
goods prices. The component related to external traded goods can be viewed as related to
the Law of One Price in the basic version of the PPP theory where the real exchange rate23
is assumed to be fixed, while the component related to traded and nontraded goods can be
related to the Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson effect or any approach where the real exchange
rate has a trend. In looking at post–Bretton Woods samples of data, Engel found that both
of these components have persistence, but the Law of One Price component seems to
experience larger shocks. The two insights may also be unified, as in recent models of
endogenous tradability (Betts and Kehoe 2001; Bergin and Glick, 2003). The researcher
can use nonlinear models with trade costs to understand the volatility related to traded
goods—as Parsley and Wei (2003) do with the Engel puzzle—and then use some version
of the Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson effect to model and estimate the slower and often
obscured drift in the prices of nontraded goods.
Conclusion
Since the early 1970s, the PPP theory has been the subject of an ongoing and lively
debate. For much of that period, theoretical work suggested that exchange rates should be
linked to relative changes in price levels with deviations that might be only minimal or
momentary, while empirical work could find only the flimsiest evidence in support of
purchasing power parity, and even these weak findings implied an extremely slow rate of
reversion to PPP of, at best, 3 to 5 years.
After a struggle to find common ground, the gap between theory and empirics is
being closed from both directions. After early disappointments with dynamic general
equilibrium models, recent applications with nominal price rigidities show how monetary
shocks may have large and long-lasting effects on the real exchange rate (Bergin and
Feenstra, 2001). When such insights are combined with theoretical work on transactions
costs and nonlinearity, we can now better understand the volatility and persistence of the
real exchange rate. Going further, the presence of nontraded goods (a manifestation of
extreme transaction costs) enriches our models further. A renewed attention to the
Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson effect and wealth effects leads to a modified view of PPP
where the equilibrium real exchange rate itself may move over time.
The idea that transaction costs matter for PPP is an old one. For Hume (1752
[1987]), goods arbitrage caused countervailing flows of specie, with the analogy that “all
water, wherever it communicates, remains always at a level,” except that if markets are24
separated “by any material of physical impediment…there may, in such a case, be a very
great inequality of money.” Heckscher (1916) developed the idea further, introducing the
concept of “commodity points.” Keynes (1923, pp. 89–90, 91–92) highlighted transaction
costs as a key substantive issue for the PPP theory:
At first sight this theory appears to be one of great practical utility... In
practical applications of the doctrine there are, however, two further
difficulties, which we have allowed so far to escape our attention,—both
of them arising out of the words allowance being made for transport
charges and imports and export taxes. The first difficulty is how to make
allowance for such charges and taxes. The second difficulty is how to treat
purchasing  power  of  goods  and  service  which  do  not  enter  into
international trade at all.…For, if we restrict ourselves to articles entering
into international trade and make exact allowance for transport and tariff
costs, we should find that the theory is always in accordance with the
facts... In fact, the theory, stated thus, is a truism, and as nearly as possible
jejune.
As  these  venerable  ideas  start  to  be  incorporated  into  formal  theory  and
empirics—in particular, via nonlinear adjustment—results are suggesting more strongly
that exchange rates do revert to a certain level determined by the price level in the long
run, and that the half-life of this reversion is short enough, at perhaps 1 to 3 years for
moderately sized shocks of more than 1 or 2 percent, to seem theoretically plausible.
Several new directions could now be taken. A very general theoretical model
could be developed to incorporate all of the above refinements simultaneously and its
predictions studied. Empiricists could attempt to include both nonlinearities and Harrod-
Balassa-Samuelson  effects  to  get  even  tighter  estimates  of  convergence  speeds.
Introducing trade costs and real shocks into a Clarida and Galí (1994) decomposition
might advance the potential for reconciliation even further.
In  sum,  however,  our  interpretation  of  the  consensus  view  of  the  PPP
debate—that short-run PPP does not hold, that long-run PPP may hold in the sense that
there is significant mean reversion of the real exchange rate, although there may be
factors  impinging  on  the  equilibrium  real  exchange  rate  through  time—is  highly
reminiscent of the consensus view that held sway in the period before the 1970s. In that
sense, this paper may be taken as evidence of mean reversion in economic thought.25
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Dollar-Sterling PPP Over Two Centuries
This figure shows U.S. and U.K. consumer and producer price indices expressed in US dollar terms over roughly the
last two centuries using a log scale with a base of 1900=0.
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PPP at Various Time Horizons
This figure shows countries’ cumulative inflation rate differentials against the U.S. in percent  (vertical axis) plotted against
their cumulative depreciation rates against the U.S. dollar in percent (horizontal axis). The charts on the left show CPI
inflation, those on the right PPI inflation. The charts in the top row show annual rates, those in the bottom row 29-year
average rates from 1970 to 1998.
Annual Consumer Price Inflation Relative to the US versus Dollar 
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Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson Effects Emerge: log Price Level versus log Per Capita Income
This figure shows countries' log price level (vertical axis) against log real income per capita for 1995, 1950, and
1913, with the U.S. used as the base counry.
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